Chapter 6: Three Persons in One Nature

1. An Underappreciated Doctrine
   • Central Mystery of the Christian Faith
     • Read paragraph on page 3 of “Theology for Beginners” about the woman who anticipated no joy from a lecture on the Blessed Trinity.
     • “The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is the central mystery of Christian faith and life. It is the mystery of God in himself. It is therefore the source of all the other mysteries of faith, the light that enlightens them. It is the most fundamental and essential teaching in the ‘hierarchy of the truths of faith’” (CCC 234; also see 88-2).
       • Recall that for theism in general, the primary truth about God is that He is existence (56-3)
     • Unfortunately, the mystery of the Trinity is typically relegated to being a mystery of arithmetic: How can three be one, and one be three? (88-1).
     • One who takes his faith seriously should delight in speaking about the Holy Trinity to interested persons. However, the fact of the matter is that Christians rarely speak of the Blessed Trinity (88-2)
   • A Dialog of the Trinity
     • When forced by circumstances to speak about the Holy Trinity (“unless he is forced to, he will not speak of it at all”), the believer’s comments tend to be centered on the “arithmetical” aspect of the “three-in-one,” and go something like that described on page 89.
       • The believer states that God revealed it, therefore it must be true.
       • The unbeliever states that it cannot be true, therefore God didn’t reveal it.
     • Sooner or later, the dialog comes down to the believer concluding, “Thus, you see, three is one and one is three” at which point the questioner retorts that three is not one and one is not three. “Then comes the believer’s great moment. With his eyes fairly gleaming he cries: ‘Ah, that is the mystery. You have to have faith’” (89-3).
     • Sheed rightly calls the believer’s explanation, “wretched nonsense.”
   • The Doctrine Disregarded
     • The result of this kind of ignorance about the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is a general disregard for the doctrine.
       • We are not inclined to think about it ourselves, and even less inclined to share the doctrine with anyone else.
       • We make the Sign of the Cross in a thoughtless manner.
       • We recite the Glory Be to the Father inattentively.
       • We mumble our way through the Nicene Creed with little concern or recognition of the profound Trinitarian truth that is being expressed.
     • There are many other religious matters that are important and should be thought about, and it is a good thing for us to think and talk about those things, but “compared with God Himself, they are as nothing: and the Trinity is God Himself” (90-1).
2. God’s Profoundest Secret
   • The Reason for the Revelation
     • That there are three persons in God is a fact of the innermost life of God; it is “His profoundest secret” (90-1).
       • “God’s very being is love. By sending his only Son and the Spirit of Love in the fullness of time, God has revealed his innermost secret: God himself is an eternal exchange of love, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and he has destined us to share in that exchange” (CCC 221).
     • God did not need to reveal this mystery to us; we could obtain salvation without knowing of the mystery (90-1).
     • So why did He reveal the mystery? “It is the surest mark of love to want to be known” (90-1).
     • Consequently, He revealed the mystery to us so we could know Him to a degree that is far beyond the knowledge of God that is available to us through philosophy.
       • Note that God’s desire to be deeply known by us is of no benefit to Him. It is purely for our benefit. Knowledge of the inner Trinitarian life of God greatly increases our ability to love Him.
     • “The revelation of the Trinity was in one sense an even more certain proof than Calvary that God loves mankind. To accept it politely and think no more of it is an insensitiveness beyond comprehension in those who quite certainly love God” (90-1).
     • How did we arrive at this state of affairs where we think so rarely of the Blessed Trinity?
       • The problem is that we attach no particular meaning to the two key words of the doctrine, person and nature (90-2).
       • The doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, in short form, is that there are three persons in one nature (90-2).
       • If the words person and nature have no particular meaning for us, they essentially drop out of the doctrine and we are left with the meaningless idea that God is simultaneously three and one (90-2).
     • The obvious solution to this problem is to come to an understanding of what is meant by nature and person.
   • The Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity
     • We should expect that by studying what God has revealed of Himself there will be some profit for us, for “it would be a horrible note of mockery [if He were to tell] us something of which we can make nothing” (91-2). So, let’s look at the doctrine.
     • In the one divine Nature, there are three Persons – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (91-3).
     • The Father is not the Son or the Holy Spirit; the Son is not the Father or the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son: no one of the Persons is either of the others (91-4).
     • The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God (91-5).
     • There are not three Gods but one God (91-6).
3. Person and Nature
   • Our Way into the Trinitarian Mystery
     • Our way into the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is necessarily through an understanding of the words “person” and “nature” (91-7).
     • When we say that in the Blessed Trinity the three are one, we are applying the numbers three and one to two different things. There are three persons; there is one nature (92-1). There is no question here of an arithmetical difficulty.
   • Nature
     • When we survey our surroundings, we see that every class of being has its own particular characteristics that distinguish it from other classes of beings. For example:
       • Oaks, maples and cottonwoods have the characteristics of trees.
       • Sparrows, crows and pigeons have the characteristics of birds.
       • Granite, quartz and marble have the characteristics of rocks.
     • We use the word “nature” to speak of the set of characteristics that distinguishes one class of being from another.
       • Hence, we speak of oaks, maples, and cottonwoods as having the nature of a tree, sparrows, crows and pigeons as having the nature of a bird, and granite, quartz and marble as having the nature of rock.
     • Because every being falls into some class of beings, it is evident that every being has a nature, and it is a being’s nature that makes it “what” it is (92-3).
   • Person
     • In the nature of human beings we find two characteristics that are not found anywhere else in material creation and that place a great distance between man and all other material creatures. Human beings have the faculties of intellect and will. These faculties give us the ability to know and to love, to think and to act according to the way we think.
     • Because the faculties of intellect and will are the principle aspects of [ontological] personality, human beings are persons; our nature is a rational nature and we are personal beings.
       • “A person is an individual substance of a rational nature” (Boethius quoted in Summa I, q. 29, a. 1).
     • We know from experience that each human being’s intellect and will is unique, that is, a unique [ontological] personality. That uniqueness allows us to identify each particular human being as a particular person. Hence, a rational being’s personality is what makes that being “who” he is (92-3).
       • “[Personality] is that which makes every being endowed with reason an independent subject who can say ‘I,’ ‘me’; and which makes him a being who belongs to himself, his own master ‘sui juris’: and by reason of which are attributed to him a reasonable nature, being, and ability to carry on the operations in which his activity consists” (Garrigou-Lagrange, “Our Savior and His Love for Us,” 83).
   • Person and Nature Readily Understood
     • To summarize, every being has a nature, but only rational beings are persons (92-3). Even a small child recognizes the difference:
       • When a child sees someone whom he does not know walk into a room, he naturally asks Who is that.
       • When a child sees an animal that he has never seen before, he naturally asks What is that.
     • A Potential Misconception
       • Based on the knowledge we have of ourselves, we may be tempted to equate person to soul (spirit), and nature to body, but this is a misconception.
       • Our nature is composed of body and soul together, which forms the suppositum or hypostasis (i.e., the integral whole) of man. Because our nature is rational, the hypostasis is a person.
   • Person Possesses Nature
     • In order to gain an understanding of the relationship between person and nature, let us first consider the relationship between a person and an object that is external to that person.
       • We speak of that relationship when we say “my book” or “my car” or “my house.”
       • In this relationship of possession, there is the possessor, “I”, a person, and there is the possessed object.
         • This understanding is so basic that even very young children recognize it: “That’s my toy!”, the child will say.
       • This relationship of possession is a one-way street between the possessor and the object possessed. The person possesses the object and the object is possessed by the person; the object does not possess the person.
     • Now, let us now apply to ourselves that relationship of possessor to object possessed with respect to person and nature (92-2):
       • We very naturally speak of “my nature,” whereas we find it unnatural and meaningless to make nature a possessive noun with respect to person so as to say, my nature’s person . . . (92-2).
       • Therefore, to say, “my nature,” is to indicate that there is a person, I, who possesses a thing called nature, which is something other than “I.” Thus, “it is the person who possesses the nature, and not the other way around” (92-2)
       • Even though the person could not exist without his nature, there is clearly a distinction between the two. Person takes precedence over nature.
   • Nature as Source of Action
     • Consider the actions of talking, walking, and sleeping with respect to four different natures:
       • A human being can do all three (all three are proper to human nature).
       • A horse can do two of the three (walking and sleeping are proper to a horse’s nature).
       • A snake can do one of the three (sleeping is proper to a snake’s nature).
       • A rock can do none of the three.
     • From these observations it follows that nature not only determines what we are; it is also the source of what we can do (92-4).
   • Person as Source of Action
     • Nature, as we have seen, is the source of action for all beings. However, for beings having a rational nature there is an additional source of action (93-1).
     • That additional source resides in “person” as we can see from universal language usage. When our nature has carried out a particular act, walking for example, we say “I was walking,” not “My nature was walking.”
       • Indeed, the power to walk comes from our nature, but unless our nature is directed to carry out a voluntary action, the action does not occur.
     • Consequently, although nature determines what things a person can do, in rational beings it is person that actually does those things (93-1).
       • This is expressed more clearly by saying the thing done is attributed to person. Or, in other words, the act is done by the person.
     • It follows that for rational beings, both nature and person can be considered sources of action, but in two different senses:
       • Person commands the action, so the action is “done” by the person.
         • For this reason, “the philosophers speak of a person as the center of attribution in a rational nature” (93-1).
       • Nature is the means by which the commanded action is done.
       • Hence, person commands, and the command is carried out through the person’s nature. Person is the center of attribution; nature is the source of operation.
     • “Whatever is done in a rational nature or suffered in a rational nature or [in] any way experienced in a rational nature is done or suffered or experienced by the person whose nature it is” (93-1).
   • Person and Nature: One Reality or Two?
     • In summary, there is a reality in us that determines who we are (person), and there is a reality in us that determines what we are (nature) (93-2).
     • But the question arises as to whether these are two different realities, or two levels or aspects of the same reality.
     • We have only a shadowy notion of our nature in its root reality, and an even more shadowy notion of self. We are more in darkness than light with respect to nature and person; hence, we cannot answer the question (93-2, 94-1).
     • Hence, we must be content to know that:
       • “Nature is the source of our operations, person does them” (94-1)
       • Person is the source of command, nature is the means of executing the command.
   • Multiplicities of Person and Nature in One Being
     • At this point, we have actually made a good deal of progress toward obtaining a deeper understanding of the Trinity, though it may seem as though we have made no progress at all (94-2).
     • From what we have considered, it will seem as though there is exclusively a one-to-one relationship between person and nature for that is our experience of person and nature (94-2).
     • By a great stretch of the intellect, we may see the possibility of a person having two natures. In such a being, the person would be capable of commanding two different natures (94-2).
     • Our challenge, however, is to come to grips with the reverse concept of three persons totally possessing one and the same nature, for this is the reality of the Blessed Trinity. We are likely to be baffled at the concept (94-2).
     • We have no experience of anything other than a one-person-to-one-nature relationship, but we must not allow that to cause us to create a false anthropomorphic limit that would restrict nature and person in God to the human limit of one person and one nature (94-2).
   • Avoiding an Anthropomorphic Limit
     • In order to avoid this anthropomorphism, we need to note a principle: We can never argue with certainty from the image of an object back to the original object itself (94-3).
       • For example, a marble statue may be an excellent replica of a man, but we cannot argue that the man is a very rigid man because the statue is very rigid (94-3).
         • The statue is rigid because of the material it is made out of, rather than because the man himself is rigid (94-3).
     • With that principle in mind, we can say that even though man is made in the image of God, that fact does not restrict God (the original) to the limits of man (the image).
     • When we consider the properties of man, made in the image of God, the question always arises as to whether man is like he is because God is like that, or because in man there is a limit as to how much the perfections of God can be reproduced in a being created from nothing (95-1).
     • With respect to the one-to-one relationship between person and nature in man, is the relationship due to “something in the nature of being, or simply something in the nature of finite being?” (95-2).
       • Because we have no experience of infinite being, we cannot answer the question.
     • Nevertheless, if God has revealed that He is three persons in one nature, we should have no difficulty accepting His word. Our only difficulty is in seeing what it means (95-2).
     • Despite the difficulty, we should expect to get some light from the Trinitarian revelation as well as from each of God’s revelations, for “short of seeing some meaning in it, there is no point in having it revealed to us; indeed, a revelation that is only darkness is a kind of contradiction in terms” (95-2).
4. Three Persons – One God
   • Precision Regarding Possession and Distinction
     • Definition (stated in another form on p. 91): In the Blessed Trinity, the one infinite nature is totally possessed by three distinct persons (96-1). We need to be precise about the meanings of the terms used in this doctrine. That is, we must be precise about the “possession of the infinite nature” and the “distinction of the persons.”
       • Sheed notes the general attitude toward precision and accuracy. In matters of science and mathematics, the virtue of accuracy is praised, whereas in “operations more specifically human” such as religion, there is a general antipathy (96-2).
       • However, in music and everything else a slight inaccuracy spoils everything. “Beauty and accuracy run together, and where accuracy does not run, beauty limps” (96-2).
     • Regarding the infinite nature, each of the three persons fully possesses the one infinite nature; it is not shared (96-1).
       • God is spirit and because spirits have no parts there is no part of them that can be shared. Consequently, the infinite nature can only be possessed in its totality, or not at all (97-1).
     • Regarding the persons, each is distinct from the other (no one of them is either of the others), but they cannot be separate because they each possess one and the same infinite nature (96-3).
       • Each of the three persons is what He is because of the possession of the one nature; apart from that one nature, none of the three persons could exist at all (96-3).
     • In other words, God has a three-fold distinction in personality and an inseparable unity in nature.
       • “There are three persons indeed, but one utterly simple substance, essence, or nature” (Lateran Council IV, 1215).
   • Three Divine Persons but Not Three Gods
     • Recall that nature determines what a being is (92-3) and what a being can do (92-4).
     • Because each of the three persons fully possesses the divine nature, each of the three persons is God and can do all the things that go along with being God (97-2).
     • Why are the three persons not three Gods? Consider three men:
       • This is a case of three distinct persons, each possessing his own separate instance of human nature (i.e., union of body and soul), but clearly separate one from another (97-4).
       • The first could not think with the intellect of the second. The second could not love with the will of the third (97-4).
     • “Three Gods” would mean three separate persons, each with his own separate Divine Nature, having the above limitations of the three men (98-1).
       • That is, three “Gods” means there would have to be three divine natures each of them infinite but each of them lacking what the other possessed. This is, of course, a contradiction, for that which is infinite cannot be lacking in anything (62-2).
     • The Blessed Trinity can do what the three men could not do: each of the three divine persons knows with the same intellect, and loves with the same will. “They are three persons, but not three Gods. They are one God” (98-1).
   • Excursus: Essence, Existence and Personality in God
     • In God substance and essence (i.e., nature) are the same reality. This is not true for created beings.
     • In created rational beings, the substance of the being is a composition of essence (nature) and existence which are united by personality.
       • “Ontological personality . . . is that which unites [essence and existence] and makes them one complete whole” (Garrigou-Lagrange, “Reality,” 214).
     • However, in uncreated being, there is no distinction between essence and existence; similarly, there is no distinction between essence and personality even though the persons are distinct one from another.
       • “In creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself [i.e., substantial]. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person . . . signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons” (Summa Ia, q. 39, a. 1).